By Cheryl Misak
Cheryl Misak deals a strikingly new view of the reception of yankee pragmatism in England. Supposedly it by no means recovered from the assaults of Russell and Moore; yet Misak exhibits that Frank Ramsey, less than the impression of Peirce, constructed a pragmatist place of significant promise, and that he transmitted that pragmatism to his pal Wittgenstein.
summary: Cheryl Misak bargains a strikingly new view of the reception of yank pragmatism in England. Supposedly it by no means recovered from the assaults of Russell and Moore; yet Misak indicates that Frank Ramsey, lower than the impression of Peirce, built a pragmatist place of significant promise, and that he transmitted that pragmatism to his buddy Wittgenstein
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Additional resources for Cambridge pragmatism : from Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein
Peirce is happy with the idea that, ‘[p]ractically speaking’, many things are ‘substantially certain’ (CP 1. 152, 1897). Practical certainty must be distinguished from absolute certainty. The former can be had, while the latter cannot. The second major contribution of pragmatism to the study of belief is to take seriously Alexander Bain’s idea that a belief is a disposition to act. Bain, a contemporary of the early American pragmatists who knew at least one of them (Holmes), had broken with traditional British empiricism.
He says in ‘The Fixation of Belief ’: It is true that we generally reason correctly by nature. But that is an accident; the true conclusion would remain true if we had no impulse to accept it; and the false one would remain false, though we could not resist the tendency to believe it. [W 3: 244, 1877] And again, in a later work: It is a damnable absurdity indeed to say that one thing is true in theology and another in science. But it is perfectly true that the belief which I shall do well to embrace in my practical affairs, such as my religion, may not accord with the proposition which a sound scientific OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/22/2016, SPi peirce 27 method requires me provisionally to adopt at this stage of my investigation.
CP 5. 416, 1905] Inquiry ‘is not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way’ (CP 5. 589, 1898). When it gives way, the ground merely shifts, rather than opening up underneath us. We can doubt one belief and inquire about it, but we cannot doubt all our beliefs and inquire about them all at once. Some things have to be held constant. Our body of background belief is susceptible to doubt on a piecemeal basis, so long as that doubt is prompted by ‘some positive reason’ (CP 5.